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“Or say 'tis not your seal, nor your invention”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

A “troll” is defined as “a dwarf or giant in Scandinavian folklore inhabiting
caves or hills.”2 The American Folktale “The Three Billy Goats Gruff” “includes
one of the stock figures of the genre, a troll who exacts a toll from all those who
seek to pass.”3 In this sense, a “troll” may form an appropriate simile: like bridge
trolls, the moniker “patent troll” may appropriately characterize any entity who
seeks to exact a toll in exchange for using a patent created by a third party. Like
many things pithy and memorable, this is an oversimplification: unlike a troll that
charges a toll for using a bridge it neither built nor owns, a patent troll charges a
toll for using products that the patent troll didn’t invent, has no intention of
producing, or both.4
A.

Trolling for Definition

Nolo defines “patent troll” as a “[d]isparaging term for someone who sues for
patent infringement but who does not make or sell any product using the patented
technology.”5 Various sources define the term more colloquially: “firms that treat
patents as lottery tickets and file expensive, time-consuming lawsuits against
companies that have supposedly infringed them;”6 or companies that “nos[e]
around patent systems and buy[] up intellectual property, often of questionable
quality, and us[e] it to extort money from genuinely innovative companies by
threatening protracted and expensive legal action.”7

1

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT act 5, sc. 1.
Troll, MERRIAM-WEBSTER: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA COMPANY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/troll (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). Merriam Webster’s etymology of “troll”
includes “Norwegian troll & Dan trold, from Old Norse troll giant, demon; probably akin to
Middle High German trolle lout.” Id.
3
LINDA S. WATTS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOLKLORE 383 (2007).
4
MATTHEW D. ASBELL, LANNING G. BRYER & SCOTT J. LEBSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY CORPORATION: A SHIFT IN STRATEGIC AND FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 144 (2011).
5
NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY, http://www.nolo.com/dictionary/patent-trollterm.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). At the time of this writing, Black’s Law Dictionary did not
contain a definition for “patent troll.”
6
Why America’s Patent System Needs to be Reformed, and How to do it, THE ECONOMIST,
Aug.
20,
2011,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/21526370?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ar/patentmedicine.
7
Tim Hartford, Taming the Patent Troll, FT MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3246d5b4-c870-11e0-833c-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1ViUH4xXh.
2
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Peter Detkin is generally accepted to have coined the phrase “patent troll.”8
While assistant general counsel of Intel Corporation, Detkin initially labeled
patent infringement plaintiffs “patent extortionists.”9
One such plaintiff
responded by suing for libel, and Detkin responded by coining the term “patent
troll.”10 Detkin explains the etymology of “patent troll” by alluding to Billy
Goats Gruff: “It's someone lying under a bridge they didn't build, demanding
payment from anybody who passed.”11
Under this definition, “patent troll” may be applied to a number of mutually
disparate entities:
(1) [I]ndividual inventors or patent owners who do not make a
product but seek to assert their patents against large corporations;
(2) small think tanks who exist to think up ideas for inventions,
patent them, and then assert or license them; (3) companies that
seek solely to acquire patents for the purpose of asserting them and
enforcing them in the courts if necessary; (4) universities and other
academic institutions; (5) government research organizations; and
(6) contract research companies.12
Due to concerns over the term “patent troll” being applied unfairly to some of
these entities, legal scholars and practitioners have devised gentler sobriquets:
“nonpracticing entity, or NPE; patent aggregator; patent marketer;
nonmanufacturing entity or nonmanufacturing patentee; patent dealer; patent
enforcer or patent enforcement specialist; patent pirates; [or] patent litigation
firm.”13 Manufacturing entities may be included if they “adopt a ‘patent factory’
approach and acquire patents covering products they are not manufacturing.”14

8

See, e.g., Lisa Lerer, Meet the Original Patent Troll, LAW.COM: AN ALM WEB SITE (July 20,
2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1153299926232&slreturn=1.
9
See ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145. Non-practicing entities "do not provide
end products or services themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing the
work of others." Id.
10
Id.
11
Transcript of 441: When Patents Attack!, THIS AMERICAN LIFE, (2011)
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/transcript (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
12
ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145.
13
Id. (formatting modified for readability).
14
Id.
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To avoid clouding the issue with potentially emotionally charged terminology,
this note will use the industry standard “nonpracticing entity,” or NPE.15
B.

The Case Against the NPE

Though the term NPE is widely accepted, the primary criticism of NPEs is
inherent in the name: instead of “commercializ[ing] the patented invention,”
NPEs “generate income through aggressive licensing and litigation of their patent
portfolios.”16 This is at variance with the Constitutional foundation for patent
law: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”17 Indeed,
“because a patent troll does not add anything to the technical sophistication of
society and their primary purpose is to extract royalties or settlements from
others, patent trolls stifle innovation and unnecessarily burden society by
increasing costs of goods.”18 While litigating lawsuits for patent infringement
may be the “cost of doing business,” this cost is “invariably passed on to the
consumer as higher costs for those goods.”19
There are two social policy justifications for our current patent system: a
bilateral exchange of additions to the public domain for a limited term of
exclusivity,20 and a unilateral incentive to invent.21 The more egregious examples
of NPEs neither contribute to the public domain nor encourage invention, instead
focusing exclusively on reallocation of wealth: an existing NPE may purchase
patents cheaply with the sole intention of leveraging the patent for pretrial
settlements or licensing revenue.22 While some NPEs acquire patents, some
patents create NPEs: as with the plaintiff-appellants in Eon-Net, a group of

15

To be certain, the term “patent troll” has enough dissenting definitions that it would be
intellectually dishonest to attempt to finalize its definition within this brief paper. Similarly, it
would be disingenuous to attempt to add the term “non-inventing entity” to the literature.
16
ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 144–45.
17
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
18
Brian D. Bender, Note: Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield: Why Catering to Concepts
of Notice is Misguided, 2 CYBARIS®, AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 73, 102 (2011).
19
Id. n. 202 (quoting Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a PIT to Catch the
Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 367, 376–77 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
20
1 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:37 (4th ed. 2010). According to this view,
the inventor's disclosure is a significant benefit; without patenting, he or she would be able to keep
the invention secret, thus preventing the stock of society's stock of knowledge from increasing.
Patenting, it is felt, is an adequate price to pay for the resulting increase in public knowledge. Id.
21
Id. § 1:38. “According to this reasoning, the expectation that patent rights will be available
causes inventions to be sought after more vigorously. This increased vigor is assumed to result in a
faster pace of invention and the creation of inventions that would otherwise not have been made.”
Id.
22
ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145.
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patents may be allocated into interrelated subgroups, and a corporation may be
created to hold and enforce that subgroup of patents. These enforcement
corporations have legal defensive and offensive advantages not afforded to
conventional corporations: as is true of Eon-Net, NPE corporations are insulated
from many conventional business-related counterclaims, including counterclaims
for patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair competition.23 Additionally, “[a]n NPE
often has no significant assets other than patents and has attorneys as its most
significant employees.”24 As described below in Eon-Net, some of the tactical
advantages enjoyed by NPEs have been counted among “indicia of extortion.”25
C.

The Case for the NPE

It is all too easy to vilify a corporation created by an attorney for the sole
purpose of generating revenue through lawsuits and threats of lawsuits. However,
supporters of NPEs point out that this financial incentive “afford[s] inventors
leverage in licensing negotiations by providing the sizeable amount of capital that
is needed to create a serious threat of litigation.”26 Couched as David versus
Goliath, NPEs provide the most powerful weapon available to small inventors
battling powerful corporations: financial capital sufficient to withstand expensive
and protracted patent litigation.
Supporters of NPEs also point out that “NPEs create a market for intellectual
property (IP) rights, which can be inherently difficult to value.”27 By creating a
market for IP rights, NPEs “allow inventors to be more readily compensated for
their patents,” compensation which may be reapplied to subsequent inventions
and concomitant patents.28 When the IP market assigns a significant value to a
particular invention, corporations and independent inventors will be increasingly
motivated to innovate in that area of technology, including designing around
currently patented technology.29
D.

The Eon-Net NPE

Some NPEs may spur some innovation, but the case at hand involves one of
three NPEs created for the sole purpose of patent holding and enforcement.30
23

See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 145.
25
See infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
26
ASBELL, BRYER & LEBSON, supra note 4, at 146.
27
Id. at 145.
28
Id. at 145–46.
29
Id. at 146.
30
See infra note 38 and accompanying text. While innovation and patent enforcement are not
necessarily mutually exclusive, some NPEs exist only to accumulate and enforce patents.
24
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While use of the term “patent extortionist” may result in a defamation lawsuit,
Eon-Net v. Flagstar helps us understand the metes and bounds of “indicia of
extortion” in NPE patent infringement lawsuits.31
Part II of this note describes an historical framework for Eon-Net, including a
description of the patent family and the district court case on appeal in Eon-Net.
Part III details the Eon-Net decision, explaining the claim construction, and
outlining the support for § 285 and Rule 11 Sanctions. Part IV analyzes the
court's discussion of a reasonable pre-suit investigation, offensive litigation, and
"indica of extortion," and how boundaries for each of these categories have
changed as a result of this decision. Part V analyzes the Eon-Net decision and
two additional efforts to combat NPE abusive practices: the judicial changes in
eBay, and the legislative changes in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. Part
V also analyzes the extent to which Eon-Net, eBay, and America Invents Act are
moving the patent system closer to achieving its societal and constitutional goals.
In Part VI, this article concludes that while these cases and legislation are a step in
the right direction, NPEs continue to have means and motivation to continue their
abusive practices.
II.

HISTORY

At issue in the Eon-Net v. Flagstar decision are three U.S. patents sharing the
title “Information Processing Methodology”:32 6,683,69733 (“‘697”), 7,075,67334
(“‘673”), and 7,184,162 (“‘162”).35 These patents disclose a system and method
for extracting specific information from a physical document for use in a
computer program.36 These patents are members of a “larger patent family that
issued from continuation and divisional applications of a parent patent application
filed in 1991 (the ‘Patent Portfolio’).”37 The inventors listed on all three patents

31

See infra Part III.
Eon-Net v. Flagstar, 653 F.3d 1314, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Eon-Net IV].
33
Information Processing Methodology, U.S. Patent No. 6,683,697 (filed Dec. 9, 1999) (issued
Jan. 27, 2004).
34
Information Processing Methodology, U.S. Patent No. 7,075,673 (filed Nov. 6, 2003) (issued
July 11, 2006).
35
Information Processing Methodology, U.S. Patent No. 7,184,162 (filed Apr. 15, 2005) (issued
Feb. 27, 2007).
36
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d 1314, at 1317. For example, the system may scan “portions of an invoice
that contain the payee address or invoice amount, . . . format[] the selected information into a
format recognized by Quicken®,” and then use Quicken® to “manipulate the information obtained
from the hard copy documents to manage accounts, write checks, and prepare business records.”
Id. at 1319.
37
Id. at 1317.
32
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are principals of Eon-Net, a patent holding company formed specifically to hold
and enforce these three patents.38
In 2005, Eon-Net sued Flagstar, alleging that processing customer-entered
website data infringed the ‘697 patent.39 Because Flagstar used technology
provided by a holder of a license to ‘697, Flagstar promptly moved for summary
judgment of noninfringement.40 Flagstar also moved for sanctions pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 1141 (“Rule 11 sanctions”), alleging “that Eon-Net failed to
investigate or identify allegedly infringing products and that Eon-Net asserted
baseless infringement claims.”42 The district court granted both summary
judgment and Rule 11 sanctions, finding Eon-Net’s hard copy document
processing patents inapplicable to Flagstar’s website, that Eon-Net’s claims were
baseless, and “that Eon-Net failed to investigate or identify allegedly infringing
products prior to filing suit.”43 On appeal, because the district court failed to
allow Eon-Net to present infringement and claim construction arguments, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded both summary
judgment and sanctions.44 Eon-Net amended its complaint to include ‘673 and
‘162,45 and when the court concluded the disputed patent terms applied only to

38

Id. Eon-Net is “one of a number of patent-holding companies formed to enforce various patents
within the Patent Portfolio.” (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc. (Eon-Net III), No.
C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 2010) (order granting
motion for fees and costs)) [hereinafter Eon-Net III]. The first five patents from the Patent Family
were assigned to Millennium L.P., the ‘697, ‘673, and ‘162 patents were assigned to Eon-Net, and
subsequent patents were assigned to Glory Licensing LLC.
39
Id. at 1319.
40
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1319.
41
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to certify “that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances . . . (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Sanctions for Rule 11 violations “must be
limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated,” and may include “an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the
reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 11(c)(4).
42
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1319 (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, *13).
43
Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, *10–13).
44
Id. (citing Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 F. App'x 189, 198 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter
Eon-Net I]).
45
Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, *20).
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hard copy documents,46 Eon-Net stipulated Flagstar did not infringe Eon-Net’s
patents.47
Following Eon-Net’s stipulation, Flagstar moved for and was granted attorney
fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“§ 285”).48 In granting Flagstar’s motion, the
district court cited four actions by Eon-Net: pursuit of baseless infringement
claims, improperly bringing a lawsuit to obtain a nuisance value settlement,
destruction of evidence, and offensive litigation tactics.49 On invitation from the
district court, Flagstar renewed its motion for Rule 11 sanctions.50 The court
granted Rule 11 sanctions, “concluding that Eon-Net and its counsel failed to
perform a reasonable pre-filing investigation and that their claim construction
positions were unsupportable.”51 The court granted $141,984.70 in attorney fees
and costs under Rule 11, and $489,150.48 under § 285.52 Eon-Net appealed the
claim construction, the § 285 exceptional case finding, and Rule 11 sanctions.53
III.
A.

THE EON-NET V. FLAGSTAR DECISION

Claim Construction

The court of appeals began by addressing claim construction de novo.54 EonNet formed a three-part argument against the district court’s construction of the
terms file, document, extract, and template.55 First, Eon-Net asserts that the
ordinary meanings of these terms “are not limited to information derived from a
hard copy document.”56 Second, Eon-Net argues the asserted claims are directed
toward a “computer file embodiment” as disclosed in the written description.57
Finally, Eon-Net cites other instances in which the United States Patent and
46

Id. at 1320 (citing Eon-Net L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24080, *31–
35 [hereinafter Eon-Net II]).
47
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320.
48
Id. (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *29). In its
entirety, 35 U.S.C. § 285 reads “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney
fees to the prevailing party.” See, e.g., Unilectric, Inc. v Holwin Corp. 243 F2d 393 (7th Cir.
1957) (holding that attorney fees may be awarded in a suit for declaratory judgment of patent
noninfringement), cert. denied 355 US 830 (1957).
49
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320 (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, *31–48).
50
Id.
51
Id. (citing Supplemental Order on Fees and Costs, at 6–8, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58784).
52
Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58784, at *24).
53
Id.
54
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320.
55
Id. at 1321.
56
Id.
57
Id.
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Trademark Office has allowed claims “that expressly recite that the claimed
‘document’ or ‘file’ is ‘not derived from scanning a hard copy document,’” and
that it must follow that these terms should not be limited to information from a
hard copy document.58
The court of appeals disagreed with Eon-Net’s arguments. While the court
agreed that “claim terms should be given their ordinary and customary
meaning,”59 claims must be read in the context of the specification,60 and that
“usually, the specification’s use of a claim is dispositive.”61 Here, as the court
pointed out, “The written description repeatedly and consistently defines the
invention as a system that processes information derived from hard copy
documents.”62 In support of its argument, the court cited passages from the
Background of the Invention, the Summary of the Invention, and the written
description,63 and that the common disclosure of the three patents includes “hard
copy document” more than 100 times.64 Addressing Eon-Net’s first two
arguments, the court found that the disputed claim terms apply to hard copy
documents, and that Eon-Net’s argument that the terms apply to a “computer file
embodiment” is “without merit.”65
Similarly, the court of appeals disagreed with Eon-Net’s claim differentiation
argument.66 First, the court pointed out that “claim differentiation is a rule of
thumb that does not trump the clear import of the specification,” and that this
specification defines the invention only in terms of information derived from hard
copy documents.67 Second, the patents cited for claim differentiation “recite that
the claimed ‘file’ or ‘document file’ is not derived from ‘scanning a hard copy
document.’”68 Unlike the cited patents, Eon-Net’s claim language does not
address a scope beyond information from a hard copy document: “The
specification discloses that ‘scanning’ is only one of many methods to obtain
information from a hard copy document . . . .”69 The court concluded “the

58

Id.
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
60
Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1321.
63
Id.
64
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1322.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1323.
67
Id. (quoting Edwards Lifesciences, LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
68
Id. (citing claim 3 of U.S. Patent 7,570,383 and claim 5 of U.S. Patent 7,672,007).
69
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1323.
59
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specification unequivocally compels the constructions adopted by the district
court.”70
B.

§ 285 Sanctions

A district court may award attorney fees under § 285 if it finds the case is
“exceptional.”71 A § 285 finding is a three-step process:72 first, the prevailing
party must “prove[] by clear and convincing evidence that the case is
exceptional;”73 second, the court must decide whether the case warrants awarding
attorney fees;74 third, the court must decide the amount of the attorney fees.75
Misconduct sufficient to support an exceptional finding under § 285 may result
from a combination of unprofessional behavior and litigation misconduct,76 or if
one party “lodg[es] frivolous filings and engage[es] in vexatious or unjustified
litigation.”77 Absent misconduct, a patentee may support a § 285 finding if the
litigation was brought in bad faith and is objectively baseless.78 Before sustaining
the district court findings, the court of appeals addressed each of these
components in turn.79
1. Litigation Misconduct
On appeal, Eon-Net asserted it had not destroyed relevant documents.80
However, Eon-Net’s principal, Mitchell Medina, testified that because Eon-Net
and Millennium81 have “evolved into patent enforcement companies which are
involved in the business of litigation,” they “have adopted a document retention
policy which is that we don't retain any documents . . . .”82 Despite having other

70

Id.
Id. at 1323.
72
See id. at 1323–24 (the case lists this as a two-step process, but then clarifies that the amount of
the award is determined only after first deciding whether attorney fees are appropriate).
73
Id. at 1323 (citing Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
74
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d, at 1323–24 (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1324 (citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs, AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
77
Id. (citing Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 549 F.3d 1381, 1387–88 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
78
Id. (citing Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailer Int'l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
79
See Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1323–1328.
80
Id. at 1324.
81
The first five patents within the Patent Portfolio were assigned to Millennium; the next three
patents were assigned to Eon-Net. Supra note 38.
82
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d 1314 at 1324 (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 143114, at *21–22).
71
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pending cases, Medina and attorney Zimmerman discarded all documents related
to the Patent Portfolio in 2003,83 though Zimmerman later asserted he only
discarded documents that were publicly available or non-essential.84 Citing EonNet’s undisputed “independent duty to preserve evidence during the ongoing
lawsuits,”85 the court of appeals concluded “in light of Medina’s testimony, it was
not clear error for the district court to conclude that Eon-Net did not observe that
duty.”86
Eon-Net also asserted that its claim construction was reasonable.87 Despite
having prevailed on their earlier appellate court case because the district court
failed to allow Eon-Net to present infringement and claim construction
arguments,88 Eon-Net “failed to offer a construction for any disputed claim terms,
lodged incomplete and misleading extrinsic evidence with the court, and
submitted declarations that contradicted earlier deposition testimony by the
declarants.”89
Eon-Net contended that the claim terms did not require
construction because the district court was not obligated to construe each claim
term.90 While true, this did not overcome Eon-Net’s submission of incomplete
and misleading evidence.91
As further evidence of misconduct, the district court noted that “Eon-Net and
Medina had a ‘cavalier attitude’ towards the ‘patent litigation process as a
whole.’”92 The district court cited an interrogatory response from a different case
involving the Patent Portfolio in which Medina asserted “the skill in the art
required is that sufficient to converse meaningfully with Mitchell Medina,”93 an
assertion the appellate court characterized as “snide.”94 The district court also

83

Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *24–26).
Id. (citing Brief for Plaintiff/Sanctioned Party-Appellant Eon-Net LP and Sanctioned PartiesAppellants Zimmerman & Levi, L.L.P. and Jean-Marc Zimmerman at 52, Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d
1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2009–1308), 2010 WL 5558498).
85
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1325 (citing Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1324.
88
Id. at 1325 (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *34).
89
Id. (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *36–37).
90
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1325 (citing O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521
F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
91
Id.
92
Id. (quoting Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *43–44).
93
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at
*44).
94
Id. Fully appreciating the hypocrisy of this statement, the author suggests avoiding referring to
oneself in the third person.
84
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cited deposition testimony in which Medina indicated he was “so sick of this
stuff, especially this haggling over stupidities and trivialities which is the name of
the game in litigation.”95 Though Eon-Net asserted the interrogatory was a
“draft,” the interrogatory was signed by attorney Zimmerman, was not amended,
was not withdrawn, and was not identified as mistakenly served.96 Moreover,
Eon-Net failed to address Medina’s deposition testimony.97 The court of appeals
concluded that Eon-Net failed to demonstrate the district court clearly erred in
finding litigation misconduct.98
2. Objectively Baseless Litigation in Bad Faith
The court of appeals began its examination of the district court finding of
baseless infringement allegations by reexamining claim construction.99 Alluding
to its earlier discussion of claim construction,100 the court reaffirmed “the written
description clearly refutes Eon-Net's claim construction . . . .”101 The court
contrasted the instant case with iLOR v. Google,102 in which a patent’s written
description did not objectively refute the patentee’s claim construction.103 The
court concluded its analysis of claim construction by addressing Eon-Net’s
observation that the court previously stated in dicta “that one portion of the
written description supported Eon-Net's construction because it discloses that the
hardware for inputting document information can include devices other than a
scanner.”104 The court of appeals stated that not only was their dicta clearly
refuted by repeated and express definitions within the written description, but also
that the same “opinion expressly le[ft] open the possibility that, after a full claim
construction analysis, the district court could conclude that Eon-Net's claim

95

Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *43–44).
96
Id. at 1325–26.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320–23; see also supra Part III.A.
101
Id. at 1326.
102
iLOR v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
103
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1326 (citing iLOR, 631 F.3d at 1378–79) (reversing the lower court’s
finding “that the patentee’s claim construction was objectively baseless where ‘[o]n its face, the
claim language does not preclude the patentee's construction,’ the written description failed to
‘clearly refute the patentee's construction,’ and the patentee could reasonably argue that the
prosecution history did not preclude its construction.”)
104
Id. (citing Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 249 Fed. Appx. 189, 196 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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construction position was baseless, which is what happened in this case on
remand.”105
The court then turned to the district court’s finding “that Eon-Net filed the
lawsuit in bad faith and for an improper purpose.”106 Eon-Net argued that the
purpose of the suit was to obtain licensing revenue, and that this constitutes a
proper purpose.107 However, the district court indicated Eon-Net’s case “had
‘indicia of extortion’ because it was part of Eon-Net's history of filing nearly
identical patent infringement complaints against a plethora of diverse defendants,
where Eon-Net followed each filing with a demand for a quick settlement at a
price far lower than the cost to defend the litigation.”108 The appellate court
analysis of the district court finding of filing multiple similar patent infringement
complaints was brief: the appellate court observed the Patent Portfolio was the
basis for “over 100 lawsuits against a number of diverse defendants . . . .”109
Turning to the district court finding of bad faith, the court of appeals found
bad faith supported by Eon-Net “exploiting the high cost to defend complex
litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.”110 Here, the
“nuisance value settlement” followed a schedule: “$25,000 for sales less than
$3,000,000; $50,000 for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and $75,000
for sales between $20,000,000 and $100,000,000.”111 This settlement offer was
“lower than the cost of litigation, a demand to which most defendants apparently
have agreed."112 In the instant case, the defendant’s cost of litigation through the
claim construction phase was over $600,000.113 Compared to Eon-Net’s
settlement schedule range of $25,000 to $75,000, it is apparent why the other 100
accused patent infringers would choose to settle.114 This settlement schedule

105

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citing Eon-Net III, No. C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *38–39 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 4, 2010) (order granting motion for fees and costs)).
107
Id. at 1324.
108
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d, at 1326.
109
Id. at 1327 (citing Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *2–4, 16).
110
Id.
111
Id. (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609, 612–13 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(order granting Rule 11 sanctions)).
112
Id. (quoting Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *38). According to this schedule, a
settlement of $25,000 may comprise a significant percentage of a company’s annual sales, e.g.,
$25,000 / $100,000 annual sales = 25%; however for companies with annual sales greater than
$3,000,000, the settlement is always less than 2% of annual sales: $25,000 / $3,000,000 = 0.83%;
$50,000 / $3,000,000 = 1.67%; $75,000 / $20,000,000 = 0.375%.
113
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1327 (citing, Eon-Net III, No. C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58784, at *8–11 (W.D. Wash. May 17, 2010) (supplemental order granting fees and costs)).
114
See id.
106
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“effectively ensured that Eon-Net's baseless infringement allegations remained
unexposed, allowing Eon-Net to continue to collect additional nuisance value
settlements.”115
In addition to the high cost of claim construction, the court noted Eon-Net was
in an advantageous offensive position “to impose disproportionate discovery
costs” on accused infringers.116 Due to local discovery rules and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is not uncommon for an accused infringer to produce
millions of pages of documents” at the expense of the producing party. 117 The
court pointed out that the $600,000 expended in the case at hand did not include
discovery unrelated to claim construction, and that full discovery would have
“substantially increased” this cost.118
The court also noted Eon-Net was in an advantageous defensive position
afforded by its status as a non-practicing entity.119 On Medina’s own admission,
Eon-Net and Millennium “evolved into patent enforcement companies which are
involved in the business of litigation . . . .”120 Due to the limited nature of EonNet’s business activities, it was immune to business-related counterclaims arising
from patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair competition.121 At no time did EonNet risk losing “patent protection over a product or process,” instead risking only
licensing revenue due to invalid or narrowly construed patents, a risk mitigated by
the high cost of litigating claim construction, the disproportionate cost of
discovery, and the comparatively low cost outlined by the settlement schedule.122
As the court noted, “[i]ts patents protected only settlement receipts, not its own
products.”123
C.

Rule 11 Sanctions

Applying Ninth Circuit law, Rule 11 sanctions require two conditions: the
complaint must be objectively “legally or factually baseless,” and the attorney
must have “failed to conduct a reasonable and competent inquiry before filing the

115

Id. at 1327.
See id.
117
Id. (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)).
118
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1327.
119
See id.
120
Id. at 1324 (citing Eon-Net III, No. C05-2129RSM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *21–22
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 4, 2010) (order granting motion for fees and costs)).
121
Id. at 1327–28.
122
See id.
123
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1328.
116

[3:133 2012] CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

148

complaint.”124 The court of appeals again alluded to its claim construction
analysis to satisfy the first condition, finding Eon-Net’s infringement allegations
to be legally baseless.125
Turning to the second condition, the court of appeals evaluated the
reasonability of Eon-Net’s pre-suit investigation.126 Eon-Net had examined
portions of Flagstar’s website and concluded the website infringed the ‘697
patent, asserting this constituted a reasonable pre-suit investigation.127 The court
of appeals disagreed, stating Eon-Net was also required “to perform an objective
evaluation of the claim terms when reading those terms on the accused device.”128
The court of appeals quoted the district court’s finding that “[t]he specification
exposes the frivolity of Eon-Net’s claim construction position,” a position that
“borders on the illogical . . . .”129 Unpersuaded that the district court abused its
discretion, the court of appeals upheld the Rule 11 sanctions.130
The court of appeals concluded by finding Eon-Net’s remaining arguments
without merit.131 In all, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s claim construction,132 the § 285 exceptional case finding,133 and Rule 11
sanctions.134
IV.

EON-NET ANALYSIS

On first impression, Eon-Net serves as a cautionary tale for NPEs.
However, even a harshly punitive rebuke is instructive: in enumerating the basis
for awarding attorney fees, the opinion of the court of appeals outlines the
minimal effort required to avoid having to pay attorney fees and costs under § 285
and Rule 11.
124

Id. at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118,
1127 (9th Cir. 2002)).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 1328–29.
127
See id. (citing Eon-Net I, 249 Fed. Appx 189, 196 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
128
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1329 (citing Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295,
1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2004); S. Bravo Sys., Inc. v. Containment Techs. Corp., 96 F.3d 1372, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
129
Id. at 1329 (quoting Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609, 616–17 (W.D.
Wash. 2006) (order granting Rule 11 sanctions)).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 1323.
133
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1328.
134
Id. at 1329. Because the court of appeals affirmed the district court, it simultaneously denied
Eon-Net’s request to reassign the case to a different district judge in a different judicial district.
Id. at 1320 n.2.
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Eon-Net listed four components supporting the § 285 exceptional case
finding: “Eon-Net's pursuit of baseless infringement claims, Eon-Net's improper
purpose of bringing the lawsuit against Flagstar to obtain a nuisance value
settlement, Eon-Net's destruction of evidence, and Eon-Net's offensive litigation
tactics.”135 Similarly, Rule 11 sanctions require a finding “that the complaint is
legally or factually baseless from an objective perspective and that the attorney
failed to conduct a reasonable and competent inquiry before filing the
complaint.”136
A.

Reasonable Pre-Suit Investigation

In the instant case, Rule 11 sanctions resulted from Eon-Net’s failure to
conduct a reasonable pre-suit investigation, which turned on Eon-Net’s failure “to
perform an objective evaluation of the claim terms.”137 At first blush, this
argument may seem circular: the court of appeals sustained Rule 11 sanctions
because of its claim construction, but claim construction could only be evaluated
by bringing its case to court. However, claim construction is routinely completed
by patentees considering filing infringement actions, and as demonstrated here, is
required in any reasonable pre-suit patent infringement investigation.
For Eon-Net, it seems Rule 11 sanctions were inevitable. Eon-Net’s
specification was so different from the accused infringer’s practices that the
district court characterized Eon-Net’s claim construction as frivolous and
illogical.138 The district court initially assessed Rule 11 sanctions and the
appellate court remanded to allow Eon-Net to present claim construction
arguments. The district court then assessed Rule 11 sanctions and added § 285
fees and costs, and the appellate court upheld this ruling.139 Though usually self-

135

See Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1320. See also supra Part III.B.2 (discussing Eon-Net’s pursuit of
baseless infringement claims); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing Eon-Net’s destruction of
evidence).
136
Id. at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118,
at 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)).
137
Eon-Net IV, 653 F.3d at 1329 (citing Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295,
1300–01 (Fed. Cir. 2004); S. Bravo Sys., Inc. v. Containment Techs. Corp., 96 F.3d 1372, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
138
Id. at 1329 (quoting Order on Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 239 F.R.D. at 617).
139
Id. at 1320–23; supra Parts II-III. Though Rule 11 sanctions seem to have been inevitable, had
Eon-Net refrained from appealing the original district court’s claim construction and Rule 11
sanctions, Flagstar would not have had opportunity to move under § 285 and the district court
would not have had opportunity to grant § 285 costs and fees “for litigating the case following
remand.” Id. at 1320 (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., No. C05-2129RSM, Eon-Net
III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58784, at *24 (D. Wash. May 17, 2010)).
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evident, this underscores the importance of performing a reasonable pre-suit claim
construction.
B.

Destruction of Evidence

As expected, a party may avoid destruction of evidence by implementing a
document retention policy, executing the “independent duty to preserve evidence
during the ongoing lawsuits.”140 Moreover, a company executive may garner
favor by avoiding glib testimony that the company has “adopted a document
retention policy which is that [it doesn't] retain any documents . . . ."141 Though
the court of appeals did not discuss spoliation of evidence,142 the court was unable
to determine whether Eon-Net attorney Zimmerman only “discarded publicly
available documents and nonessential documents” as claimed,143 and could not
conclude that Eon-Net had observed their duty.144
C.

Offensive Litigation Practices

Similarly, Eon-Net’s offensive litigation practices should be avoided. At a
minimum, care should be taken to avoid “lodg[ing] incomplete and misleading
extrinsic evidence with the court, and submitt[ing] declarations that contradict[]
earlier deposition testimony by the declarants.”145 Additionally, when trying a
case remanded specifically to afford the opportunity to argue claim construction,
it is important to offer a construction for any disputed claim terms. Of course, a
party should avoid submitting—and should make a reasonable effort to amend
any—“snide” interrogatory responses.146

140

Id. at 1325 (citing Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
Id. at 1324 (citing Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., No. C05-2129RSM, Eon-Net III,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *21–22).
142
“Spoliation of evidence refers to the ‘act of damaging evidence.’” Michael A. Zuckerman, Yes,
I Destroyed The Evidence – Sue Me? Intentional Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois, 27 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 235, 236 (2009). “The word ‘spoliation’ is derived from the
Latin phrase omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorum, which means ‘all things are presumed
against a despoilor or wrongdoer.’” Id. at n.17 (citing Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth
and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1087
(1987)).
143
Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Brief for Appellant at 52).
144
Id. at 1325.
145
Id. (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., No. C052129RSM, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *36–37).
146
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
141
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Indicia of Extortion

Unlike destruction of evidence and offensive litigation, the threshold for
“indicia of extortion” is not clearly defined. However, the court of appeals listed
two affirmative actions taken by Eon-Net: filing a series of “nearly identical
patent infringement complaints against a plethora of diverse defendants,” and
following each filing with a settlement demand “at a price far lower than the cost
to defend the litigation . . . .”147 To avoid the former indication, patent litigants
should make reasonable efforts to identify potential infringers with more
certainty. To avoid the latter indication, patent litigants should follow the initial
infringement suit filing with a demand higher than Eon-Net’s schedule: while this
may increase the likelihood that a company may not settle before claim
construction, it would increase the value of the cases that settled, and Eon-Net
suggests a court would be less likely to find “indicia of extortion.”148
Also listed among “indicia of extortion” are the offensive and defensive
advantages afforded to Eon-Net by virtue of its status as a non-practicing entity.
Offensively, Eon-Net is in a position to use discovery rules to impose
disproportionate discovery costs on an accused patent infringer. Defensively,
Eon-Net undertook minimal risk by suing: “As a non-practicing entity, Eon-Net
was generally immune to counterclaims for patent infringement, antitrust, or
unfair competition because it did not engage in business activities that would
potentially give rise to those claims.”149 Unfortunately for everyone involved,
these are some of the characteristics endemic to NPEs, and little can be done to
mitigate them.
V.
A.

CURTAILING THE NPE

Three-Pronged Attack

In order to constrain the activities of the NPE, Eon-Net provides for § 285 and
Rule 11 sanctions. In addition, other courts and the legislature have begun to
address some of the tactical advantages of NPEs. Two of the most significant

147

Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (citing Exceptional Case Order, Eon-Net, L.P. v. Flagstar
Bancorp, Inc., No. C05-2129RSM, Eon-Net III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143114, at *36–37).
148
Cf. Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Eon-Net supports the proposition that a low settlement
schedule can be counted among “indicia of extortion”; it follows that the same court would be less
likely to fault a more expensive settlement schedule).
149
Id. at 1327. The court of appeals expounded, stating “while Eon-Net risked licensing revenue
should its patents be found invalid or if a court narrowly construed the patents' claims to exclude
valuable targets, Eon-Net did not face any business risk resulting from the loss of patent protection
over a product or process. Its patents protected only settlement receipts, not its own products.” Id.
at 1327–28.
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efforts are the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange,150 and the
enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.151
1. Sanctions after Eon-Net
Other than demonstrating a willingness to apply Rule 11 and § 285, Eon-Net
does little to deter other NPEs from a careful execution of Eon-Net’s otherwise
successful get-rich-quick scheme. The scheme is the classic modus operandi of
NPEs: allocate a few related patents to a non-practicing company, identify
companies likely to have infringed on the patents, file an infringement suit, and
follow the suit with an offer for settlement. Indeed, patents within the Patent
Portfolio assigned to Millennium were used to extract settlements in “six or seven
dozen cases” of alleged patent infringement before being declared invalid,152 and
there appears to be no suggestion of attorney discipline.153 Just as businesses may
view defending against NPE patent infringement suits as a cost of doing business,
so may NPEs view Rule 11 and § 285 as a cost of doing business. The full
judgment against Eon-Net of $631,135.18 may be recouped in twenty-five
$25,000 settlements or nine $75,000 settlements. If the Millennium patents
extracted six dozen settlements at a median value of $50,000 before being
declared invalid, this would result in a windfall of $3,600,000.154
Not only do NPEs have a clear financial motivation to pursue potential patent
infringers, but potential infringers also have a clear financial motivation to pay for
a patent license. Given the choice between paying for a patent license and
defending against infringement, “we can expect the potential infringer to be
willing to pay a licensing fee equal to or less than the total expected cost under the

150

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284–341 (codified as
35 U.S.C. passim).
152
Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., No. 09-4252, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51888 at *3
n.1 (D. N.J. May 16, 2011) (citing April 25, 2011 Tr. at 37:12-37:21).
153
New Jersey Judiciary records do not indicate Eon-Net attorney Jean-Marc Zimmerman has
ever been disciplined (http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/oae/discipline.htm), though it appears that
Zimmerman was declared ineligible to practice law from October 26, 2009 (see Notice to the Bar
Re:
IOLTA
Ineligible
List,
available
at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2009/n091023a.pdf) to September 27, 2010 (see Attorneys
Reinstated
from
Ineligible
List,
available
at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2011/n110921b.pdf) for an unspecified violation of New
Jersey rules on Income on Non-Interest Bearing Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) Fund (see
Income on Non-Interest Bearing Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) Fund, available at
http://www.ioltanj.org/lwr_courtrules.html).
154
The median (middle value) of $25,000, $50,000, and $75,000 is $50,000; $50,000 x 6 x 12 =
$3,600,000.
151
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litigation option.”155 The cost of litigation is comprised of “(1) the expected cost
of court-awarded damages; (2) the expected cost of having to comply with a
permanent injunction, whether through a design-around, licensing, or simple
termination of infringing activity; and (3) the expected cost of litigation itself,
including attorney fees and court costs.”156
Because damages and permanent injunctions generally may not precede a
determination of infringement, a relatively weak patent suit will mitigate the
exposure associated with damages or permanent injunction.157 For patent suits in
general, “most litigation costs are apparently incurred by the end of discovery,” so
the cost of litigation will dominate the patent infringement exposure
calculation.158 Because litigation costs in defending against patent infringement
are “generally at least on the order of $1 million,”159 a potential infringer has
substantial motivation to settle even a weak patent suit. Of course, for stronger
allegations of patent infringement, the alleged infringer is under the additional
financial pressure applied by the potential cost of damages or a permanent
injunction.
2. Injunctions After eBay v. MercExchange
Eon-Net v. Flagstar was notable for its atypical award of attorney fees and
costs to the defendant. More conventionally, attorney fees are available as a
remedy for patent infringement, along with compensatory and equitable relief.160
For the purposes of the current NPE discussion, this section focuses on recent
changes in equitable relief and their chilling effect on NPE lawsuits.
Equitable relief for patent infringement includes preliminary and permanent
injunctions.161 A court may issue a preliminary injunction to “prevent possible
155

John M. Golden, SYMPOSIUM: Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent Reform
Commentary: "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2126 (2007). (this
“assum[es] that transaction costs associated with licensing can be treated as negligible”). Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 2127–28.
158
Id. at 2128 (citing Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Report of
the Economic Survey 2005, at 22 (2005)).
159
Id. at 2128 & n.60. Compared against Eon-Net’s settlement schedule of $25,000-$75,000
amounts to 2.5-7.5% of $1,000,000, which lends support to the appellate court characterization of
such a schedule as a “nuisance value settlement.” See Eon-Net, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327; supra note
49 and accompanying text. However, compared to the initial award of $141,984.70, $75,000 is
52.8%.
160
SHELDON W. HALPERN, CRAIG ALLEN NARD & KENNETH L. PORT, FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED
STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 283 (2nd ed.
2007).
161
Id.
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ongoing infringement of a patent prior to a finding of infringement,”162 and until
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,163 a permanent injunction usually followed a
finding of infringement.164 While “an injunction may be of little or no value to a
plaintiff whose patented technology is long outdated at the conclusion of a
lengthy trial,”165 injunctions could be “extremely valuable, even for their bullying
power alone.”166 Such threats can significantly increase settlement offers,
especially for an NPE filing a series of lawsuits intended to induce quick
settlements.
Between the 1983 case Smith International, Inc., v. Hughes Tool Co.167 and
the 2006 eBay case,168 “the Federal Circuit presumptively granted equitable relief
in patent cases.”169 During this time, “courts' preference for granting equitable
relief amounted to a great deal of leverage for plaintiffs when negotiating
licensing agreements and one-time settlement payments with alleged
infringers.”170 One such case resulted in a windfall judgment: faced with an
injunction from the manufacture and sale of Blackberry® devices, defendant
Research in Motion, Ltd. was ordered to pay the patent holder NTP more than
$612 million.171
The courts’ presumption of equitable relief met its end with the eBay decision.
The district court initially found eBay to be infringing MercExchange’s business
method patent “for an electronic marketplace designed to foster commercial
transactions between private individuals through a common trusted entity.”172
162

Id. at 286 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994)).
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
164
HALPERN, NARD & PORT, supra note 160, at 286. “After finding infringement, a court
generally grants a permanent injunction unless there is a sufficient countervailing reason.” Id.
(citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
165
Damon C. Andrews, Article: Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219,
239 (2011).
166
Id. at 240 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85
TEX. L. REV. 783, 798 (2007)). “The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will
force the downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be very powerful. These
threats can greatly affect licensing negotiations, especially in cases where the injunction is based
on a patent covering one small component of a complex product.” Id. n.116
167
718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
168
eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
169
Andrews, supra note 165, at 239. “It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when
infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it.” Id. n.110 (quoting
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
170
Id. at 240 (citing Lily Lim & Sara E. Craven, Symposium Review: Injunctions Enjoined;
Remedies Restructured, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 792 (2009)).
171
Id.
172
Id. (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 390).
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While the district court awarded damages, it denied MercExchange’s request for a
permanent injunction.173 On appeal, the Federal Circuit granted an injunction,
“applying its ‘general rule’ that ‘a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been adjudged.’”174
Dissatisfied by the
application of a “general rule” to a grant of an injunction, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit’s injunction, “holding that prevailing
patent owners must satisfy a four-factor test before a court can grant injunctive
relief.”175 In a notable concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy observed that “firms
have shifted from a regime in which patents were used ‘as a basis for producing
and selling goods’ to one in which patents are primarily ‘bargaining tool[s] [used]
to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the
patent.’”176
In the five years following eBay, many commentators predicted patent holders
would find it more difficult to obtain injunctions, often alluding to Justice

173

Id. (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
Andrews, supra note 165, at 241 (citing MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
175
Id. (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391). As a prerequisite for granting an injunction, the four factors
set out in eBay are as follows:
(1) [T]hat [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.
eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. The four eBay factors are quite similar to the four factors set out by the
1983 case of Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co.:
First, whether the party seeking the injunction (the movant) has sufficiently
established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits . . . . Second,
whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not
granted . . . . Third, whether a balance of hardships tips in the movant’s favor . .
. . The final consideration is whether an injunction will impair the public
interest.
HALPERN, NARD & PORT, supra note 160, at 286–87. The four eBay factors are
substantially similar to the four factors prescribed by Smith v. Hughes, suggesting that the
Supreme Court was intentionally guiding lower courts away from application of a general
rule.
176
Andrews, supra note 165, at 241 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). One
commentator applied Kennedy’s concurrence to NPEs, observing "Justice Kennedy's concurrence
struck a far different tone, focusing in particular on why nonpracticing patentees should be refused
injunctions." Id. n.125 (quoting Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing
Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 32 (2009)).
174
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Kennedy’s oracular concurrence.177 Data suggest injunctions remain widely
available: “district courts have awarded permanent injunctions in more than
seventy-five percent of the 164 patent cases since eBay.”178 However, several
courts focus on whether lawsuit parties are in direct competition: injunctions were
“granted in twenty-four of twenty-six cases in which the parties were found to
compete directly,” and “injunctions were denied in five of nine cases in which the
parties were found to not compete directly.”179 Several of the cases denying
injunctions “have hinged on the fact that the plaintiff was a non-practicing
entity.”180 As courts continue to interpret Kennedy’s concurrence to offer
injunctive relief primarily to direct competitors, and as additional court decisions
explicitly grant or deny injunctive relief based on a party’s status as an NPE, eBay
will continue to have a chilling effect on the viability of NPE lawsuits.181
3. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was signed into law by President
Barack Obama on September 16, 2011.182 Of the many patent system changes
within the law,183 NPEs will be most affected by the new limitation on joinder of
parties.

177

Id. (citing Nina Medlock et al., The Non-Practicing Patentee's Right to a Permanent Injunction
Restraining Patent Infringement: Going Once, Going Twice, Gone?, 18 No. 9 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J., Sept. 2006, at 1, 2–3; Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing
Patentees after eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 32 (2009)).
178
Id. at 242 (citing Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings by District Courts to 1-16-2011,
PATSTATS.ORG (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html). See also Post-eBay
Permanent Injunction Rulings in Patent Cases to 12-4-11, PATSTATS.ORG (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://www.patstats.org/Injunction_rulings_post-eBay_to_12-04-2011.post.xls (data indicates
exactly 150 injunctions granted and 50 denied, current as of Dec. 4, 2011).
179
Id. nn. 130–31. (citing Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of
Obtaining Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 442–
44 (2008)).
180
Id. at 243 (citing z4 Techs, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex.
2006)).
181
As long as litigation costs predominate legal exposure in defending against patent infringement,
the effect of equitable remedies will remain limited.
See John M. Golden, SYMPOSIUM:
Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Commentary: "Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2130 (2007).
182
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, supra note 151.
183
See, e.g., Kenneth E. Levitt, Patent Reform Becomes Law: The Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, DORSEY, Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://www.dorsey.com/eu_ip_leahysmith_91411/. The
law “[m]oves the United States from a ‘first-to-invent’ to a ‘first-inventor-to-file’ system . . . ;
[b]roadens the scope and definitions of prior art; [e]xpands the “prior user” defense to patent
litigation . . . ; and [c]reates new procedures for challenging the validity of patents . . . .” Id.
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While rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already allows joinder
of parties if the action arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and has a
common question of law or fact,184 the new law prevents defendants from being
joined “based solely on allegations that they infringed the patent(s) at issue.”185
While plaintiffs may still join defendants handling a common product, plaintiffs
may not “join defendants selling or distributing different products based only on
plaintiffs’ allegations that each of these products separately infringes the
patent(s).”186
NPEs were afforded several tactical advantages by the previous, more
expansive interpretation of permissive joinder. NPEs were able to pay a single
filing fee to join “dozens of defendants in the same suit” in a remote, plaintifffriendly forum.187 As a result, defendants were forced to choose between
expensive litigation in an unfriendly forum and a settlement “on unfavorable
terms.”188 When deciding venue from among the plaintiff’s location and the
locations of defendants throughout the country, “courts often conclude that the
forum selected by the plaintiff is just as convenient to all parties.”189 However,
for a single defendant, a court may be more likely to choose the defendant’s
forum, “where the majority of documents and witnesses relating to the purported
infringement should reside.”190
B.

Analysis of Attack on NPEs

Any remedy to NPE abuses must overcome three challenges: NPE actions are
generally legal,191 NPEs are inherently difficult to categorize,192 and NPEs have
184

FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A–B) (stating that defendants may be joined if “(A) any right to relief
is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law
or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”).
185
Robert C. Van Arnam, The Joinder Provision in the Patent Reform Act: Leveling the Playing
Field Against Multi-Defendant NPE Suits, MARTINDALE.COM, Sept. 20, 2011, available at
http://www.martindale.com/retail-trade/article_Williams-Mullen_1344570.htm.
186
Id. Limitations to joinder were modified in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: “For
purposes of this subsection, accused infringers may not be joined in one action as defendants or
counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations
that they each have infringed the patent or patents in suit.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
supra note 151, sec. 19 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 299(b)).
187
Van Arnam, supra note 185.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
See, e.g., Travis Burchart, Your Good Will Hunting Moment: Arguing for the Non-Practicing
Entity or Against the Patent Troll, LEXISNEXIS PATENT LAW COMMUNITY BLOG (Aug. 22, 2011,
7:57:00
AM),
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strong financial motivation to continue abusive practices.193 These cases and
legislation strike at the heart of all three NPE challenges.
Somewhere between permissible legal practices and outright extortion, EonNet circumscribes a set of corporate and legal circumstances sufficient for Rule 11
sanctions and § 285 costs and fees. While Eon-Net significantly constrains the
legal activities available to NPEs, unfortunately it stops short of making these
“indicia of extortion” alone a sufficient ground for sanctions.
Similarly, eBay and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act define and
constrain NPEs, but with limited effect: cases after eBay attempt to limit
injunctions to directly competing firms,194 but data show that not all noncompeting firms were denied injunctions. The America Invents Act excises the
common NPE practice of joining unrelated defendants in a disadvantageous
jurisdiction,195 and while requiring NPEs to file separate cases will increase their
cost, it may not overcome the financial motivation of NPEs.196
These effects of Eon-Net, eBay, and the America Invents Act are at variance
with a strict constructionist view of the Constitution: because the Framers never
distinguished NPEs from practicing or inventing entities, “many scholars argue
that the behavior of patent trolls is perfectly within the realm contemplated by
Congress throughout the development of U.S. intellectual property law.”197
Moreover, heraldic proponents of NPEs tout the capital provided to inventors by
NPE-purchased patents.198
However, when an NPE seeks to extract money through litigation or an in
terrorem settlement,199 it neither encourages invention nor adds to the public
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/patentlaw/blogs/patentlawblog/archive/2011/08/22/yourgood-will-hunting-moment_3a00_-arguing-for-the-non_2d00_practicing-entity-or-against-thepatent-troll.aspx (“Patents are valuable assets/property and the enforcement of rights is a
legitimate activity.”).
192
See supra Part I.A.
193
See supra notes 152 and accompanying text.
194
See supra note 179 and accompanying text. The data suggests injunctions for non-competing
firms are less likely following eBay, but not strictly excluded.
195
See supra note 190 and accompanying text. As with non-competing firms, this constraint helps
define NPEs by their abusive practices.
196
See supra notes 152 and accompanying text.
197
Robin M. Davis, Note: Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent Injunctions in
Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and eBay v.
MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 433 (2008).
198
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
199
Cf. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps to
explain how ordinary pleading rules seek to prevent settlement costs from being increased by an in
terrorem threat of litigation: “But to the extent that it permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless
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domain.200 By reserving judicial resources for non-sanctionable cases201 and by
retaining capital within entities actively engaged in production or research and
development, Eon-Net, eBay, and the America Invents Act move us closer to
accomplishing our Constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science
and useful Arts . . . .”202
VI.

CONCLUSION

Eon-Net is one of the most recent examples of possible consequences of
egregious conduct by an NPE. To NPEs, Eon-Net adds definition to what may be
considered “indicia of extortion.” To all legal practitioners, Eon-Net adds
definition to the set of litigation misconduct sufficient for Rule 11 sanctions and §
285 costs and fees. Similarly, eBay and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
constrain the scope of litigation available to NPEs. Taken together, NPE activity
will be hamstrung by limitations to joinder, permanent injunctions, and the threat
of Rule 11 sanctions and § 285 costs and fees.
While Eon-Net is instructive, its practical effect will remain limited by the
strong financial incentives for NPEs. Without a systematic effort to mitigate the
strong financial incentive and apparently infrequent consequences to the practices
of NPEs, the NPE “patent troll” is far from extinction.

claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the
process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.).
200
See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
201
As a possible alternative, "energy might be better directed to devising alternatives or
improvements to today's costly court proceedings - such as better initial screening of patents by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, more effective reexamination proceedings, or a new brand
of administrative ‘opposition’ proceedings." Golden, supra note 181, at 2130 (citing Joseph
Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 961–64 (2004); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents
Survive in the Market and How Should We Change? - The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55
EMORY L.J. 61, 122 (2006)).
202
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

